Within the program of finding axiomatizations for various parts of computability logic, an earlier article proved that the logic of interactive Turing reduction is exactly the implicative fragment of Heyting's intuitionistic calculus. That sort of reduction permits unlimited reusage of the computational resource represented by the antecedent. An at least equally basic and natural sort of algorithmic reduction, however, is the one that does not allow such reusage. The present article shows that turning the logic of the first sort of reduction into the logic of the second sort of reduction takes nothing more than just deleting the contraction rule from its Gentzen-style axiomatization. The first (Turing) sort of interactive reduction is also shown to come in three natural versions. While those three versions are very different from each other, their logical behaviors (in isolation) turn out to be indistinguishable, with that common behavior being precisely captured by implicative intuitionistic logic.
Introduction
This article is a new addition to the evolving list of papers [6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16] devoted to finding axiomatizations for various fragments of computability logic. The latter is a program for redeveloping logic as a formal theory of computability, as opposed to a formal theory of truth which it has more traditionally been. The approach was introduced in [5, 10, 15] . The most recommended reading for getting familiar with the basic philosophy, motivations, concepts and techniques of computability logic is the tutorial-style [15] .
In computability logic, formulas express interactive computational problems defined as games between the two players ⊤ (machine) and ⊥ (environment), with logical operators standing for basic operations on games. "Truth" of a problem/game means existence of an algorithmic solution, i.e. ⊤'s effective winning strategy. And validity of a logical formula is understood as (such) truth under every particular interpretation of atoms.
Among the most interesting of the operations studied in computability logic are several versions of reduction. The strongest and simplest form of reduction (of B to A) is A → B. This is a parallel play of the two games A and B with the roles of ⊤ and ⊥ interchanged in the antecedent. Winning a given run of this game for ⊤ means winning B as long as the adversary wins A. Since the roles of the players are switched in the A component, the latter, as a computational problem from ⊥'s perspective, becomes a computational resource for ⊤. Namely, ⊤ can observe how the adversary is solving/playing (a single session) of A, and utilize that information in its own solving/playing B.
At the other extreme is the weakest form of reduction • -. The game A • -B can be characterized in the same terms as A → B, with the difference that, in A • -B, unlike A → B, ⊤ is allowed to reuse A (as a computational resource) any number of times, with "reuse" here understood in the strongest algorithmic sense possible. Namely, at any time, ⊤ can temporarily abandon a given position of A (while reserving the right to come back to it later), backtrack to any of the earlier positions of it and try a different continuation from there, thus forcing ⊥ to play multiple parallel sessions of A against such a capricious adversary in this most unfair game: the failure of ⊥ to win A in all sessions of it automatically results in ⊤'s victory.
There is a whole spectrum of natural reduction operations of intermediate strength between → and
• -. Only some of those have been officially introduced within the framework of computability logic so far, with more to be probably defined later depending on particular needs, motivations and tastes. It has been repeatedly pointed out earlier that the formalism of computability logic is open-ended, welcoming any meaningful augmentations. n , where n is a natural number. It means the same as ⊃, only the number of allowed (re)usages of the antecedent is limited to n, so that A ⊃ 0 B is nothing but simply B, and A ⊃ 1 B is nothing but A → B. But bounds do not necessarily have to be natural numbers. Reasonable transfinite ordinals could be interesting to study as well, such as ordinals less than ǫ 0 . For example, where ω is the smallest infinite ordinal, A ⊃ ω B would mean a game where ⊤ has to declare a number n before starting using A, after which the game continues as if it was A ⊃ n B. This generalizes to A ⊃ kω B for any k ≥ 0, where k (rather than just one) declarations n 1 , . . . , n k are made. The first declaration n 1 opens n 1 copies of A for usage; the second declaration n 2 , which can be made any time later when the previously "activated" copies of A are perhaps already at advanced stages, creates the possibility to use n 2 additional copies; the third declaration activates n 3 additional copies, etc., with the overall number of (re)usages of A thus eventually not exceeding the finite n 1 + . . . + n k . Next, A ⊃ ω 2 B would be a game where ⊤ has to declare a number n before starting using A, after which the play continues as it would proceed in A ⊃ nω B. This can be further generalized to A ⊃ Furthermore, • -has an even greater variety of bounded versions of potential interest, especially in the (yet to be developed) area of interactive computational complexity theory. One may want to differentiate between just bounds on the overall number of reusages of the antecedent and bounds on, say, the "depths" of reusages. Roughly, the depth of reusages here means the maximum number of ancestor positions of any given run of the antecedent at which restarts ("forkings", "replications") happened. In more precise terms -for those familiar with the relevant formal definitions -such bounds would mean bounds on the heights of the corresponding underlying bitstring trees (see [15] ).
For > -, on the other hand, the above concept of depth is not meaningful as it automatically trivializes to 1 (or to 0, depending on whether or not only proper reusages count).
Finite or bounded versions of reduction operations, except the "most finite" and "most bounded" →, have never been studied, and at this point we do not know what logics they induce. In what follows our focus is only on →,
Of these four operations, • -stands out as, in a sense, most natural and important. What makes • -special is that it has good claims to precisely capture everything that anyone would ever call A where the oracle can be queried only once (while, as we know, ordinary Turing reducibility does not impose any limits on how many times the oracle can be queried).
As it turns out, the logical behaviors of > -, • -ℵ0 and • -are indistinguishable when these operators are taken in isolation, and that common behavior is precisely captured by the implicative fragment Int ⊃ of Heyting's intuitionistic calculus. For > -and • -, a proof of this fact was given in [11] . And the present paper contains an outline of how to extend that proof to • -ℵ0 as well. As for →, it turns out that its logical behavior is captured by CL7, which is (the Gentzen-style axiomatization of) Int ⊃ with just the contraction rule deleted. In other words, CL7 is nothing but the implicative fragment of affine logic. A proof of this result is the main technical contribution of the present article. And this is not a result that could be taken for granted. As shown in [15] , affine logic in its full language, while sound, is far from being complete with respect to the semantics of computability logic. In fact, even just the (→, ¬)-fragment of computability logic is not the same as the corresponding fragment of affine logic, nor does it appear to be axiomatizable in traditional proof theory.
Another way to summarize the main technical result of the present paper is to say that the set of implicative binary tautologies and their substitutional instances is precisely described by CL7.
Here binary tautologies mean tautologies of classical logic where no atom occurs more than twice, and implicative binary tautologies are binary tautologies that contain no connectives others than →. Binary tautologies and their instances have arisen in the past as a class of formulas sound and complete with respect to several natural semantics, most notably Blass's game semantics for linear logic [2], Blass's resource-conscious semantics for classical logic [3] , the semantics of computability logic [5] , and abstract resource semantics [9] . This class of formulas has stubbornly resisted any axiomatization attempts within the framework of traditional deductive approaches and, as argued by Blass in [2] , apparently this phenomenon is not quite an accident. A reasonable axiomatization for the set of binary tautologies and their instances was eventually found in [9] , but it took switching to a substantially new deductive framework called cirquent calculus (roughly, it is sequent calculus where formulas may be shared between different sequents), indirectly corroborating Blass's thesis that binary tautologies are foreign to traditional proof theory. Against this background, the fact that the implicative fragment of that wild class can still be tamed with traditional means such as substructural sequent calculus in which CL7 is constructed, is worth receiving our attention.
Logic CL7
The languages that we consider in this paper have infinitely many nonlogical propositional atoms for which we use the metavariables P, Q, and have no logical atoms. Where ⊃∈ {→,
by a ⊃-formula we mean a formula built from atoms and (the binary) ⊃ in the standard way. We will be using E, F, G, H as metavariables for formulas, and Γ, ∆ as metavariables for (possibly empty) multisets of formulas. As usual, we write Γ, ∆ or Γ, F instead of Γ ∪ ∆ or Γ ∪ {F }. A (two-sided) ⊃-sequent is a pair Γ ⇒ F , where Γ is a finite multiset of ⊃-formulas and F is a ⊃-formula. Here Γ is said to be the antecedent of the sequent, and F is said to be the succedent.
We axiomatize CL7 using two-sided →-sequents. A (→-) formula H is considered provable in this system (written CL7 ⊢ H) iff the empty-antecedent sequent ⇒ H is so.
The axioms of CL7 are all →-sequents of the form
And the system only has the following two rules of inference:
We say that a formula of classical propositional logic (with →-formulas here also seen as such) is binary iff no atom occurs in it more than twice. The concepts of being binary, tautological, true or false extend from formulas to sequents by understanding each sequent E 1 , . . . , E n ⇒ F as the formula E 1 ∧ . . . ∧ E n → F . A (substitutional) instance of a given formula F , as usual, means the result of replacing atoms in F by any formulas, with all occurrences of the same atom being replaced by the same formula, of course. [15] ).
Proof. The equivalence between (ii) and (iii) in a stronger form which is not restricted to just →-formulas, has been proven in [9] .
2 So, to prove the present theorem, it would be sufficient to show that (i) implies (iii) (call this soundness) and that (ii) implies (i) (call this completeness). This will be done in the following two sections. 2
The soundness of CL7
We can rewrite CL7 into a clearly equivalent system that uses one-sided sequents, here restricted to finite multisets of formulas of classical propositional logic without →, where negation is applied only to atoms. This is done by rewriting each →-sequent E 1 , . . . , E n ⇒ F as ¬E 1 , . . . , ¬E n , F , and then iteratively rewriting each (sub)formula E → F as ¬E ∨F , each subformula ¬(E ∨F ) as ¬E ∧¬F , each subformula ¬(E ∧ F ) as ¬E ∨ ¬F and each subformula ¬¬E as E. The axioms of the resulting system are all sequents of the form Γ, ¬F, F , 3 and the rules of inference now read as follows:
Among several equivalent axiomatizations of the (multiplicative fragment of the) well known affine logic is the one that uses one-sided sequents in our present sense. It has the same axiom scheme Γ, ¬F, F . And the above Right → and Left → rules are special cases of the ∨-introduction and ∧-introduction rules of that system, respectively, where ∧, ∨ are seen as multiplicatives. 4 Thus, understanding E → F as an abbreviation of ¬E ∨ F , affine logic proves every →-formula provable in CL7. But, as proven in [15] , affine logic is sound with respect to the semantics computability logic, and the latter sees no difference between E → F and ¬E ∨ F . So, clause (i) of Theorem 2.1 implies clause (iii), as desired.
The completeness of CL7
We define the head of a →-formula as follows:
• Every atom is its own head.
• The head of E → F is that of F .
Consider any binary →-sequent Γ ⇒ F . We define the relevant formulas of this sequent to be the elements of the smallest set S such that:
• Every formula of Γ whose head occurs in F is in S.
• Every formula of Γ whose head occurs in some element of S is also in S.
The formulas of Γ that are not relevant will be said to be irrelevant.
Lemma 4.1 Assume Γ ⇒ F is a binary tautological →-sequent, and ∆ is the result of deleting from Γ all irrelevant formulas of Γ ⇒ F . Then the sequent ∆ ⇒ F is also tautological (and, of course, remains binary).
Proof. Let Γ, ∆, F be as above. In what follows, by a "relevant formula" we always mean a relevant formula of Γ ⇒ F . Similarly for "irrelevant", "antecedent", "succedent".
Suppose that ∆ ⇒ F is not tautological. Consider a truth assignment that makes it false, i.e., makes ∆ true and F false. Extend it to all formulas of Γ by stipulating that, if an atom does not occur in ∆ ⇒ F , it is true. Obviously the head of every irrelevant formula is true under this extended assignment and hence every irrelevant formula is true. All relevant formulas of the antecedent also remain true. And the succedent remains false. So, Γ ⇒ F is false and hence non-tautological. 2 Lemma 4.2 Assume Γ ⇒ E and Γ ⇒ F are binary sequents, where E and F do not share any atoms. Then the sets of relevant formulas of the two sequents are disjoint. 3 Of course, it does not matter whether here and later we write Γ or ¬Γ, with ¬Γ meaning the multiset of the negations of the elements of Γ. 4 In fact, writing E instead of ¬E, Right → is simply the same as the ∨-introduction rule of affine logic.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. Consider an arbitrary relevant formula G of Γ ⇒ E. Let P be the head of G. If the reason for G's relevance is that P occurs in E, then (as E and F share no atoms) P does not occur in F , nor does it occur in any formula of Γ other than G because of the binarity of the sequent. This, by the definition of relevance, means that G is not a relevant formula of Γ ⇒ F .
Suppose now the reason for G's being a relevant formula of Γ ⇒ E is that P occurs in some relevant formula H of Γ ⇒ E. The relevance of H has thus been established earlier than that of G and hence, by the induction hypothesis, H is not a relevant formula of Γ ⇒ F . But, in view of binarity, the only two places where P occurs (whether it be within Γ ⇒ E or Γ ⇒ F ) are in G and H. Hence G cannot be a relevant formula of Γ ⇒ F . 2 Lemma 4.3 CL7 proves every binary tautological →-sequent.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary binary tautological sequent. We may assume that its succedent is an atom P , for otherwise, if the succedent is E → F , move E to the antecedent of the sequent, and repeat the same until the succedent has become atomic; in view of the presence of Right → in CL7, provability of the resulting sequent implies provability of the original one.
If P is one of the formulas of the antecedent, then the sequent we deal with is an axiom and thus CL7 proves it.
Otherwise, the antecedent should contain a formula E → F whose head is P , or else the sequent could be falsified by the truth assignment which makes P false and makes all other atoms true. Thus, the sequent we are talking about looks like Γ, E → F ⇒ P , where P occurs in F and hence occurs in neither E nor Γ, as the sequent is binary. Obviously the tautologicity of this sequent implies the tautologicity of Γ, F ⇒ P . Since E does not contain P , the tautologicity of Γ, E → F ⇒ P also implies the tautologicity of Γ ⇒ E. Indeed, assume that some truth assignment falsifies Γ ⇒ E. Extend that assignment to all atoms of Γ, E → F ⇒ P in such a way that it makes P false. Obviously such an extended assignment falsifies Γ, E → F ⇒ P , contradicting our assumption that this sequent is tautological. Thus, Γ, F ⇒ P and Γ ⇒ E are binary tautological sequents, and their succedents do not share any atoms. Let Γ 1 and Γ 2 be the submultisets of Γ consisting of all relevant formulas of Γ, F ⇒ P and Γ ⇒ E, respectively. By Lemma 4.2, Γ 1 and Γ 2 are disjoint. Also, by Lemma 4.1, Γ 1 , F ⇒ P and Γ 2 ⇒ E are tautological. Hence, by the induction hypothesis (where induction is on the number of connectives occurring the sequent), these two sequents are provable. Then, by Left →, the sequent Γ 1 , Γ 2 , E → F ⇒ P is also provable. This can be easily seen to imply the provability of the original sequent Γ, E → F ⇒ P , as CL7 is obviously closed under the weakening rule "from ∆ ⇒ G conclude ∆, H ⇒ G". 5 2
In view of the evident fact that CL7 is closed under substitution of atoms by whatever formulas, Lemma 4.3 immediately implies the desired conclusion that, whenever H is a →-formula which is an instance of some binary tautology, H is provable in CL7.
The three versions of weak reduction
As noted in Section 1, the three weak reduction operations can be defined in terms of → and the corresponding three recurrence operations
(Recurrences have the highest precedence, so ∧ | A → B should be read as (∧ | A) → B, and similarly for
We refer to ∧ | as parallel recurrence, and refer to • | ℵ0 and • | as branching recurrences.
Namely, •a finite number of 1s; otherwise we say that w is essentially infinite. We extend these terms from bit strings to the corresponding threads in the play of • | A. The definition of • | A thus requires from ⊤ to win A in all -whether they be essentially finite or essentially infinite -threads. All it takes to turn that definition into a definition of • | ℵ0 is to relax that requirement and, when determining the winner, only look at essentially finite threads. Since there are only countably many essentially finite bit strings, only countably many runs of A are generated -more precisely, only countably many runs of A are of relevance -in • | ℵ0 A. This completes our informal definition/explanation of • | ℵ0 . As for a formal definition, fully stating it here might be a little lengthy and unnecessary. Instead, just for the bureaucratic purposes of registering • | ℵ0 as a full-time citizen of computability logic, we rely on [15] and officially introduce • | ℵ0 by the following stipulation:
can be obtained from the definition of • | given in [15] through replacing, in the second clause of the latter, the words "for every complete branch" by "for every essentially finite complete branch".
To see the distance between • | and • | ℵ0 , following Vereshchagin [16] , let us consider any set S of natural numbers, such that S is not recursively enumerable. Let A be the game where only ⊤ has legal moves, each legal move being a(ny) natural number. A given run of this game is considered won by ⊤ iff the set of the moves it makes in it equals S. In other words, ⊤ wins iff it enumerates S. Now let us look at the games • | A and • | ℵ0 A, where ⊓x(B(x) ⊔ ¬B(x)) is that it waits till the adversary makes a move m, after which ⊤ creates two threads, making move 1 in one thread and move 2 in the other thread. The same trick, however, fails with ∨ | ⊓x(B(x) ⊔ ¬B(x)). For example, it fails when ⊥ chooses m = 1 on board #1, m = 2 on board #2, m = 3 on board #3, etc. Let us call this strategy of ⊥ the diversifying strategy. Now, for any effective strategy M of ⊤, using diagonalization, we can construct a particular predicate B(x) such that ⊤ loses ∨ | ⊓x(B(x) ⊔ ¬B(x)) against the diversifying strategy. Namely, we can define B(i) (any i) to be true if M makes the move 2 on board #i when playing against the diversifying strategy, and false otherwise. This guarantees that M's all responses to the adversary's moves are "wrong". A similar idea could be employed in showing that ∨ | ⊓x⊔y y = f (x) has no algorithmic solution.
Implicative intuitionistic logic
Where ⊃ is one of the operators > -, • -ℵ0 or • -, a Gentzen-style axiomatization of the corresponding implicative (fragment of) intuitionistic logic, denoted by Int ⊃ , is CL7 -only with ⊃-sequents instead of →-sequents, of course -plus the following single additional rule
⊃ could be chosen to be formulated exactly as CL7, with the only difference that the antecedents of sequents in Int ⊃ are seen as sets rather than multisets of formulas, which eliminates the need for explicitly stating contraction as an inference rule. For Int > -and Int •-, this theorem was established in [11] . As an aside, the result of [11] for Int •-was further strengthened in [14] , where soundness and completeness (with respect to the semantics of computability logic) was proven for the full propositional fragment of intuitionistic logic. With only a one or two months' delay, Vereshchagin [16] came up with an alternative (and shorter) proof of the same result. It should be noted, however, that in his work Vereshchagin modified the "canonical" definitions of computability logic quite a bit, which essentially resulted in interpreting intuitionistic Blass's repetition operator R than to • | ℵ0 in our present precise sense. In view of (and despite) the above-said, Vereshchagin's proof, with only some minor technical adjustments, can be considered a proof of the (remaining) Int •-ℵ 0 part of Theorem 6.1. Alternatively, the proof of the soundness and completeness of Int •-given in [11] is, in fact, also a proof of the soundness and completeness of Int •-ℵ 0 : a simple re-reading of that proof reveals that virtually no step in it relies on the fact that we deal with the uncountable rather than the countable version of reduction. Furthermore, the soundness part of that proof can be dramatically simplified when we are concerned with • -ℵ0 rather than • -. Specifically, a lemma on which the soundness proof given in [11] (as well as similar proofs given in [1] and [16] ) relies is about the validity of the principle
And a strict proof of that lemma, given in [15] , takes several pages. On the other hand, a proof of the validity of the same principle for • | ℵ0 instead of • | would not take more than just a paragraph, as it did (for Blass's or Vereshchagin's versions of • | ℵ0 ) in [1] or [16] . As another aside, the above-said also applies to the proof of the soundness and completeness of the full propositional intuitionistic logic given in [14] . That proof officially is for the case when the intuitionistic implication is read as • -. However, the same proof is just as good for • -ℵ0 as well.
Similarly, Vereshchagin's [16] completeness proof can be easily adapted to either interpretation • -, • -ℵ0 of intuitionistic implication. The same cannot be said about Vereshchagin's soundness proof though: as noted above, proving soundness when intuitionistic implication is read as • -rather than • -ℵ0 takes considerably greater efforts. Finally, for reasons similar to the above, the soundness proof for the full first-order intuitionistic calculus given in [13] , is equally good for either reading • -, • -ℵ0 of intuitionistic implication.
